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 Demographic factors influence the intensity and duration of conflicts and 
collective violence is more common where there are high numbers of young men to older 
men, and where there are more marriageable men to women.  The notion that young, 
unmarried men are more likely than other cohorts to be unattached risk-takers explains 
these findings.  This dissertation investigates whether these same demographic factors 
increase the likelihood a country will produce suicide attackers.   
 Information on individual attackers was assembled from three earlier studies and 
corroborated using LexisNexis searches of major world news publications.  Personal 
information, including age, sex, and country of origin, was collected for 1,208 individual 
suicide attackers who acted between 1981 and 2007.  This information was then used to 
create a second dataset to make comparisons between countries and regions that produced 
suicide attackers and those that did not.  Thirty-three of the 219 countries and regions 
analyzed produced suicide attackers, and those that did had higher numbers of 
marriageable men to women, higher polygyny rates, higher percentages of Muslims in 
their populations, and larger populations overall.  Counter to the hypothesis, countries 
with higher numbers of young men to old were less likely to produce suicide attackers.   
It may be that the older men in polygynous societies create an even greater scarcity of 




relatively few reproductive and perhaps other alternatives, these young men are more 
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SUICIDE MISSIONS:  A HISTORY OF IDEAS 
  
Introduction and Roadmap 
 
 The goal of this dissertation is to provide a small but significant contribution to 
the understanding of suicide missions and predict where they might emerge.  The paper 
follows the spirit of the following quote  
Selectionist logic suggests that high risk behaviors, such as terrorism, are 
more common in high fertility populations (e.g. Daly and Wilson 1988).  
We are not aware of any research that links terrorism, religiosity, and 
fertility decisions, but this would be a worthwhile pursuit.  (Sosis and 
Alcorta 2008:11). 
 
 Violence and aggression have long been of interest to evolutionary researchers, 
and this paper extends on their earlier work.  A detailed discussion of how evolutionary 
theory applies to suicide missions comes later, but the point must be made now that while 
sociocultural factors account for much of what people do, evolved psychological and 
behavioral traits do, too; and while evolutionary theory cannot completely account for all 
behaviors, violence included, it can independently fill gaps left by cultural and 
materialistic explanations.      
 The next few paragraphs describe how this paper is organized.  Since there is no 
unanimously accepted definition of “suicide terrorism”, a section on definitions and 






both historic and modern contexts; this is followed by a detailed discussion of the 
evolutionary approach used throughout the paper; a section detailing the proposed 
explanations for suicide missions follows that.  Much of the research on suicide attacks is 
contentious, making it difficult to issue, or justify, generalizations about it; therefore, this 
overview takes a conservative approach when discussing a “root cause” of suicide 
missions since it has become clear that monocausal explanations do not satisfactorily 
explain them all.  Finally, a discussion of the differences between men’s and women’s 
motivations for suicide attacks is followed by an overview of which explanations for 
suicide mission are best supported empirically.   
  Chapter 2 outlines the hypothesis to be tested, along with methods of data 
collection and analysis.  The majority of the incidents examined here came from 
previously published reports, so methods of selection and verification are also 
discussed.  The chapter offers a justification for using information criteria (e.g., 
Akaike’s Information Criterion) in place of stepwise regression or R2 for selecting 
the models presented subsequently.   
 Chapter 3 presents the results of the analysis; tables of descriptive and univariate 
statics are followed by additional discussion of model selection methods, and then, the 
full multivariate models.  The analysis supports the hypothesis that operational sex ratio 
and young-old ratio are correlated with the likelihood a country or region will produce 
male suicide attackers; a discussion intended to establish causation in this correlation 
follows.  The results are then used to develop a predictive model showing which of the 






 Chapter 4 closes the dissertation with a summary of the results and possible 
proscriptions for curbing the appeal of suicide terrorism.  These include “offshore 
balancing” (placing naval power near conflicts instead of building permanent military 
installations in foreign countries), negotiating with insurgent leaders, encouraging people 
to stop supporting groups who use suicide terrorism, and improving women’s social and 
economic status.   
 
Definitions and Semantic Origins 
 The aphorism, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” (Seymour 
1975), illustrates why there are dozens of definitions of “terrorism.”  Context matters:  
terrorism does not occur in a vacuum and the social, political, philosophical, religious, 
and moral justifications for its use are important to its definition.  “Terrorism,” according 
to The United Nations General Assembly (1994:3) constitutes “criminal acts intended or 
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public.”  While useful in some 
contexts, this definition presents a problem for research on suicide missions because, as 
of 2005, no “clear evidence” showed that the now defeated Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Elam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers) used suicide missions to directly attack, and therefore 
terrorize, citizens (Hopgood 2005:44).  Although many Sri Lankans died in LTTE attacks 
on important financial and military targets, these deaths were arguably incidental or 
“collateral.”  That said, in 1997 the United States Department of State designated the 
LTTE a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” (FTO).  Was the LTTE a terrorist organization 
prior to this?  If not, did the 2006 bombing that killed 60 civilians, including 15 children 






made them, or a Belgian, or a Lithuanian?  These questions are not intended to make light 
of the situation in Sri Lanka; rather, they are meant to illustrate the difficulty of defining 
terrorism.  This paper avoids the “terrorist” label, not only because of the issues with its 
definition, but because doing so does not distract in any way from the analysis; whether a 
suicide attacker is a “terrorist” is irrelevant here.       
  Researchers also do not agree on what to call those who purposefully kill 
themselves in the midst of military or insurgent actions; they have been called “suicide 
attackers,” “suicide terrorists,” and “suicide bombers.”  Hafez (2007) and Pape (2005) 
use these terms interchangeably, while Gambetta (2005:6) refers only to “suicide 
missions,” which he defines as “violent attack[s] designed in such a way as to make the 
death of the perpetrators strictly essential for its success.”  Hafez (2007:6) defines 
“suicide terrorism,” as “a premeditated attack by an individual who willingly uses his or 
her body to carry or deliver explosives to attack, kill, or maim others.”  While this 
definition explicitly mentions explosives, it is consistent because Hafez’s dataset does not 
include the 9/11 attacks.  Pape (2005:10), says a suicide attacker, “does not expect to 
survive the mission and often employs a method of attack (such as a car bomb, suicide 
vest, or ramming an airplane into a building) that requires his or her death in order to 
succeed.”   
 Gambetta’s definition is used here, along with the terms “suicide attackers” and 
“suicide attacks,” primarily because this definition is broad enough to encompass those 
given by Pape and Hafez, but also because Gambetta offers additional details about the 
types of targets suicide attackers go after, like military personnel, civilians, symbols, and 






succeeded in killing themselves while attempting to kill others or render useless 
symbolic, military, or other property belonging to their stated enemies.   
 
Historical and Modern Uses of Suicide Missions 
 Suicide attacks are not are not a new phenomenon; Jewish Sicarii used them 
nearly 2000 years ago, as did 11th century Muslim Hashishiyun, or “Assassins.”  Highly 
skilled members of these groups infiltrated their targets’ inner circles, often lying in wait 
for years before using daggers or swords to kill them. 
 The invention of dynamite in 1867 extended the potential of suicide attacks.  For 
assailants who came after this, long-term intimacy was no longer a prerequisite for 
success; small bombs could kill with a high degree of certainty, and do so in spite of 
bodyguards.  The first suicide bombing occurred on March 13, 1881, not long after the 
invention of stable, portable, high explosives.  On that day, Ignaty Grinevetsky exploded 
a bomb near himself and Czar Alexander II of Russia, killing them both along with 
several others (Goldman et al. 2003).  Grinevetsky, a member of the group Narodnaya 
Volya (The People’s Will), became the first of several anarchist suicide bombers to act in 
prerevolutionary Russia (Kalyvas and Sanchez-Cuenca 2005).  
 Suicide attacks saw widespread use in World War II after 1944.  More than 3,800 
Japanese Kamikaze pilots intentionally crashed bomb-laden planes, submarines, and 
boats into Allied targets, and at least two American pilots crashed into enemy ships 
although doing so was reportedly unnecessary (Hill 2005).  Shortly ahead of the assumed 






soldiers to slip under tanks while wearing backpack bombs, but the tactic did not see use 
in the war (BBC 2005).   
 Kamikaze pilots began their missions with full fuel tanks and were encouraged to 
return to base if they could not find sufficient targets:  their missions were well thought 
out and deliberate.  Like the suicide attackers of today, most Kamikazes were young, 
unmarried men.  Of one graduating class of Japanese pilots, 99 percent indicated a 
willingness to participate in Kamikaze attacks (Hill 2005).  Interestingly, one outspoken 
dissenter tore up his volunteer form and said “I have a sweetheart and I want to marry her 
when this war is over (Yokota 2000:21).   
 After a nearly 35 year absence, the “modern era” of suicide attacks emerged in the 
early 1980s with Lebanese attacks against French, Israeli, and American targets.  Late in 
the 1980s, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers) adopted the tactic 
for use in Sri Lanka and India.  In the 1990s, suicide missions came into widespread use 
in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and were also used by the Kurdistan Worker’s Party in 
Turkey.  The 21st Century saw continued use of suicide attacks by Palestinian groups and 
the LTTE and their spread into Russia as part of the Chechen separatist movement.  With 
the attacks of September 11, 2001, suicide attacks infamously arrived on American soil.  
The Iraq War witnessed widespread use of suicide attacks by insurgents against US and 
coalition forces.  At the same time, the tactic came to use in less obvious places, 
including China and Bangladesh.  The modern age of suicide missions has been aided by 
the advent of the internet, which organizers use to recruit members and disseminate 







The Absence of Suicide Missions 
 Relative to the number of conflicts the world has witnessed over the last two 
millennia, suicide missions appear to occur rarely:  Is this evidence of absence or absence 
of evidence?  It may be that historical accounts did not include cases of suicidal attacks, 
or that the lack of instantaneous media dissemination left them relatively unknown; 
which is the case remains unresolved.   
Hopgood (2005:73) provides an intuitive rationale for why groups might employ  
suicide attacks, saying  
 At the group level, the benefits [of suicide missions to the group using 
them] are clear:  rather than allowing the ‘natural heroes’ to emerge under 
battle conditions (for which we might see the award of bravery medals as 
an indicator, many Victoria Cross holders in Britain having received them 
posthumously for acts of ‘suicidal’ courage), why not pre-select them, 
train them, and position them with the kind of explosives or other weapons 
with which they can hope to fully realize their military goal. 
 
Following this logic, suicide missions make strategic sense.  Groups engaged in 
collective violence might select their most heroic members for premeditated attacks, 
rather than waiting for them to rise to the top in the heat of battle.    
 Today, suicide attacks constitute less than two percent of all terrorist incidents, 
and most of these are perpetrated by a “handful” of groups (Kalyvas and Sanchez-Cuenca 
2005:209; RAND Corporation 2003).  Relative to conventional tactics, suicide attacks 
have had extraordinary success at inflicting casualties (Atran 2006):  So why are they not 
used more often?  Kalyvas and Sanchz-Cuenca (2005) suggest several reasons for their 
absence.  First, people may simply not have thought of the technique, or they lacked the 
technology for its implementation.  The fact that early 19th century Russian anarchists 






facilitated the use of suicide missions.  Second, organizations that might otherwise 
employ suicide missions may operate within societies morally opposed to their use.  The 
Irish Republican Army (IRA), for example, did not use suicide missions; perhaps because 
suicide is expressly forbidden by the Catholic Church, regardless of the justification.  
Third, suicide missions may be counterproductive in the face of local, national, and 
international reactions; if such sanctions outweigh the benefits suicide attacks bring, it 
may be best to avoid them.  Fourth, suicide attacks may be prohibitively expensive in 
both financial and human terms.  Although modern suicide missions are inexpensive, 
World War II kamikaze attacks were costly since they often sacrificed well-trained 
officers along with their aircraft (Hill 2005).  Fifth, there may be a lack of people willing 
to participate in suicide missions; laser guided bombs do not have freewill; human beings 
arguably do.   
 Since their inception, suicide missions have come and gone in warfare.  Following 
World War II, they were absent the world for more than three decades; yet they have 
occurred every year since 1981.  What the Molotov cocktail was to 19th century 
revolutionaries, the suicide attacker may be to those of the 21st:  an effective, 
inexpensive, and pervasive weapon of insurrection.    
 
Applying Evolutionary Theory to Suicide Missions 
Biologists, sociologists, and anthropologists have long assumed that scarcity, 
whether natural or man-made, is the chief catalyst for both social competition and 
social conflict (Hudson and Boer 2004:36). 
 
The following four sections show how psychological, social, and demographic 






relatively new field of “demographic security” focuses on predicting and preventing such 
violence.  Cincotta (2004), notes that while “demography is not destiny,” there are 
several population-level factors associated with conflict, including:  1) a youth budge 
(Mesquida and Weiner 1999); 2) rapid urban population growth (Fuller and Pitts 1990); 
3) low levels of cropland or water per person (Cincotta et al. 2003a); 4) a population 
decline of working-aged adults (Cincotta et al. 2003b); 5) differential growth rates 
between neighboring ethnic or religious groups (Grammich 2002); 6) migration (UN 
Population Division 2001); 7) aging and population decline (DaVanzo and Grammich 
2001); and 8) a high sex ratio (Hudson and Boer 2004).  From an ecological and 
demographic standpoint, it is clear that aggression and violence stem, at least in part, 
from competition over a wide array of resources.  While the present research focuses on 
the first and last of the causes above, a youth bulge and high sex ratio, the others may 
also motivate suicide missions.     
 The majority of suicide attackers are young men (Hafez and United States 
Institute of Peace 2007; Pape 2005; Ricolfi 2005); possibly because they are more prone 
to risky behavior than any other sex or age class (Daly and Wilson 1985).  Males have 
high reproductive variance compared to females, so in the competition for a relatively 
limited number of reproductive opportunities, some males will have many children or 
mates over a lifetime, while others will have none (Trivers 1972).  Violence is not the 
only possible outcome of this scenario; across the animal kingdom cuckoldry and 
“sneaker” strategies are alternatives (Kokko and Jennions 2008; Queller 1997), but 
human violence is at times motivated by reproductive competition (Chagnon 1988).  The 






Syndrome,” operational sex ratio, and young-old ratio might interplay to produce suicide 
attackers. 
 
“Young Male Syndrome” 
This dissertation revolves around young men and their propensity for risk taking 
behavior.  Daly and Wilson (1985) call this tendency as “Young Male Syndrome” 
(YMS).  “Young Male Syndrome” was devised to explain sex-biased homicide rates in 
Detroit, where males committed 422 of the 512 (82.4 percent) murders recorded there in 
1971 (Daly and Wilson 1985).  The majority of both victims and perpetrators were 
young, unmarried men, and over half of the homicides resulted from “trivial altercations” 
(Daly and Wilson 1985:63) involving personal attacks on “face” or social status (Daly 
and Wilson 1985:1). 
 Daly and Wilson’s work suggests that protecting status is a central cause of 
violence between young men.  If a reputation is worth dying over, is a piece of land, a 
friend, an ideology, or a religion?  Wilson and Wrangham (2004:234) suggest that gang 
violence is at times motivated by territorial concerns, but that “the principal biological 
influence on collective violence is the male’s concern for status.”  Citing Vigil (1988), 
they continue, saying that older gang members are “more likely to be involved in 
alternative ways of achieving status, such as employment or gain-associated crime, than 
in violence” (Wrangham and Wilson 2004:238).   
 In gangs, direct participation in physical violence is the domain of young men.  It 
may be that in some conflicts, young men find a lack of political, economic, and 






Support for this is evident in the literature, where “humiliation” is regularly cited as a 
motivation for participation in suicide missions (e.g., Atran 2003a; Atran 2006; Gill 
2007; Kruglanski and Golec 2004).  
 
Young-Old Ratio 
 Young male syndrome may explain why most suicide attackers are young men, 
but why is it that some regions of the world produce more of them than others?  
Mesquida and Weiner (1999) suggest a link between young male syndrome and young-
old ratio (YOR), the number of men aged 15-29 years in a population relative to the 
number of men over 30 in the same population.  Theoretically, the amount of risk young 
men are willing take to access resources varies according to local conditions.  For 
example, as the ratio of young males to old in a population increases, so should 
competition for reproductive and other resources.  This explains why populations with 
youth bulges have more conflict; they are comprised of relatively high numbers of young, 
unattached men who are more likely than any other demographic cohort to take risks.  
 Conceptually, populations with high YORs (i.e., many young men relative to old) 
are more susceptible to conflict than those with low ratios.  In the words of Mesquida and 
Weiner (1999:183) 
Competition for mates is greatest just before the usual age of marriage; young 
males must compete for connubial resources among themselves, and also with 
older males who control the political and economic resources of society.  It is 
therefore possible that war efforts are instigated by young, unmarried men, for 
purely selfish reasons.  This, in fact, would go a long way in explaining why 
violent intergroup conflicts are executed almost exclusively by young males, 
often under the supervision of older, more established leaders.  Political leaders, 
contrary to what is traditionally assumed, may not actually foment wars.  But 
because they are themselves threatened by the young men, they may attempt to 






Populations with high YORs do, in fact, experience longer and more severe conflicts than 
those with low (Mesquida and Weiner 1999).  Youth bulges have traditionally been 
mitigated by effectively removing some young men from populations using conscription, 
religious service, repression, or emigration (Cincotta 2004). While speculative, it may be 
that these institutions, which are often created by older men, encourage group harmony.   
  
Operational Sex Ratio 
 The fact that females generally invest more than males in offspring is called 
“Bateman’s Principle” after the idea’s namesake who conducted a series of experiments 
with fruit flies (Drosophila melanogaster), later generalized to humans, showing how 
anisogamy, sexual selection, and reproductive effort are related (Bateman 1948).  
Bateman suggested that, since they produce larger gametes than males, females should be 
objects of competition for men.  Recent advances in sexual selection theory indicate that 
Bateman’s Principle is not universally applicable to human populations and that sex ratio, 
sex specific mortality rate, mate encounter rate, and additional factors contribute to how 
“choosy,” “coy,” or “competitive” each sex should be (Kokko and Monaghan 2001).  In 
addition, reproductive success in human populations differs according to mating system, 
being highest in polygynous societies and lowest in monogamous ones (Brown et al. 
2009).   
 Trivers (1972), expanded on Bateman’s Principle, saying that, after they give 
birth, females should continue investing more than men in offspring since they have 
“sunk” more effort into their development.  The assumption that anisogamy necessarily 






the “Concorde Fallacy” (i.e. it is better to continue investing in the future if you have 
invested in the past) (Dawkins and Carlisle 1976; Kokko and Jennions 2008).  Trivers’ 
logic is potentially fallacious because there comes a point at which an individual is 
economically better off cutting their losses and beginning anew, rather than sinking 
further resources into a bad investment.  Female mammals, therefore, are not necessarily 
obligated to invest in offspring just because they have invested in larger gametes.  That 
said, Trivers (1972) noted that female mammals usually invest more than males, 
suggesting men should compete with each other for reproductive opportunities with 
women.  
 Emlen and Oring (1977:215) paraphrase Darwin (1871), saying  
When one sex becomes a limiting factor for the other, the result is an increase in 
intrasexual competition among members of the available sex for access to mates 
of the limiting sex. 
 
Again, although the “competition” to which this quote alludes may imply violence, it is 
not the only possible strategy.  For males, alternatives include extra-pair copulations and 
other “sneaky” strategies, and there are good theoretical reasons to expect these; after all, 
why should an individual increase its chance of injury or death by fighting in an already 
risky environment?  By this logic, risky conditions might actually select against risky 
behavior (Kokko and Jennions 2008; Queller 1997).  For human males, however, 
violence can have both direct and indirect payoffs.  Group members can benefit from 
violence and seem interested in it, suggesting it generates an audience effect.  In at least 
some cases, violence begets social and reproductive rewards for men (Chagnon 1988).  
  Operational sex ratio (OSR) is “the average ratio of fertilizable females to 






evolutionary biology and anthropology have used this simple metric to address questions 
on sexual selection, costly signaling, and parental investment.  Authors define OSR in 
different ways; some derive it using the original female to male calculation, while others 
use male to female, possibly because it is how primary and secondary sex ratios are 
traditionally reported.  This paper opts for the latter definition (where male-biased 
populations have higher OSR) because it is most common in the current literature and 
continues under the assumption that high, or male-biased, OSR leads to increased 
competition between males over female investment in offspring.  Populations with 
especially high OSRs may be more likely to produce suicide attackers compared to those 
with low OSRs.            
 
Kin Selection and Hamilton’s Rule  
 From an evolutionary perspective, suicide attacks appear irrational because they 
sacrifice the actor’s life along with their potential to reproduce.  Other “altruistic” acts in 
nature also seem irrational; but many are actually “selfish” in the Darwinian sense, 
especially when their benefits fall on family members (Dawkins 1976).  Hamilton (1963; 
1964) theorized that individuals should act altruistically if the cost incurred to them by 
their actions is outweighed by the benefit they provide to kin.  He formulated this 
relationship in an equation known as “Hamilton’s Rule” 
    C < rB                                    (1) 
where C is the cost of the action, r is coefficient of relatedness of the actor to the 
beneficiary, and B is the benefit of the action to all related parties.  Hamilton’s Rule has 






 If suicide attacks are, in part, motivated by kin selection, they must satisfy the 
above inequality.  In other words, the potential reproduction given up by an attacker must 
be recouped by their kin, which becomes more likely the more close family members 
they have.  One of the initial goals of this project was to test the hypothesis that suicide 
attackers come from larger than average families, but the data to do so were simply 
unavailable.  Fortunately, Hamilton’s Rule still has theoretical value here, but making the 
most of it requires moving focus from benefits to costs. 
 As the value of C in Hamilton’s Rule decreases, so do the values of r and B 
needed to satisfy it. Theoretically, the less likely a suicide attacker is to reproduce, the 
lower the reproductive cost of his or her actions.  OSR and YOR can proxy male-male 
competition because higher values mean greater numbers of men competing for a limited 
number of reproductive resources.  In other words, the average male in a high OSR or 
YOR population has lower reproductive prospects than the average male in a low OSR or 
YOR population; this fact rebalances Hamilton’s inequality and may lead to increased 
male risk taking, and thus more suicide attackers, in high OSR and YOR populations. 
 While they may increase the odds that a population produces suicide attackers, 
demographic characteristics cannot explain all suicide missions.  A glance at the raw data 
show high OSR and YOR in regions of Central Africa, the Middle East, and Southern 
Europe.  If the demographics were enough to generate attackers, those regions should see 
high rates, but they do not.  Instead, high OSR and YOR may work in conjunction with 
other factors to push populations to a “tipping point” of attacker production.   
Rather than the simple measure of OSR used here, which takes into account the 






modified calculation that takes into account the average woman’s “time in” and “time 
out” of the reproductive pool; this assumes women are reproductively unavailable when 
married or pregnant.  To maximize sample size, this dissertation assumes all 
reproductively aged women are available throughout their reproductive years; however, 
the analysis includes polygyny rate as a control variable.  While not the primary focus of 
this research, polygyny plays a hypothetical role in suicide attacker production because it 
reduces the number of reproductively aged females in a population.  Regions with high 
polygyny rates may be more likely to produce suicide attackers relative to those with 
lower rates.   
 
The Timing, Goals, Effectiveness, and Targets of Suicide Attacks 
There are logical reasons for why groups might use suicide missions; if such 
attacks work better than conventional means to garner concessions, recruit people, and 
kill or terrorize enemies, they could win favor over traditional tactics (Bloom 2005; Pape 
2005).  There is evidence that suicide missions are particularly effective at inflicting 
casualties:  on average, they kill more people per attack than traditional methods (Atran 
2006; Pape 2005).  In terms of destructive potential, suicide missions are an effective 
tactic of modern warfare.  
 Judging the political effectiveness of suicide missions requires knowing the goals 
of the groups employing them.  Since such organizations are comprised of individuals 
who may have different opinions, they must organize their membership around some 
central goal or purpose, just like any political or religious group.  Individual opinions 






cause" by maintaining membership.  Overall, members of groups using suicide missions 
share the opinion that suicidal violence is the only means to achieve their goals (Bloom 
2005).  In a way, these people are not unlike revolutionary Marxists, who believe true 
socialism can only be realized through the overthrow of a capitalist system.  
 Pape (2005) explains that that suicide missions might give the weaker party in a 
conflict more leverage than they might otherwise have, leading to concessions.  This 
speculation should, however, be framed as a hypothesis and tested against data; 
reasonableness does not make something so.  Pape (2003; 2005) contends that the 
primary goal of groups using suicide attacks is expelling foreign occupation from what 
the group perceives as their ethnic or national homeland.  If Pape is correct about this, 
seven of the 13 (54 percent) suicide attack campaigns that occurred between 1980 and 
2003 were successful (Pape 2005).  This rate of success is “remarkable,” according to 
Pape (2005), who speculates it would be closer to 30 percent suicide attacks absent.  
 Since Pape’s analysis was published, however, three of the longest running and 
most studied suicide campaigns have failed to repel occupation:  the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam fell to Sri Lankan troops in 2009; American troops remain stationed 
throughout the Middle East; and Palestinians continue living sanctioned, marginalized, 
and occupied.  While foreign occupation may cause some suicide attacks, such tactics 
may not be more successful than traditional methods of repelling foreign forces.  
According to Pape (2005) and Bloom (2005), suicide attackers generally appear in 
the second iteration of a conflict.  There were no suicide bombings during the Gulf War, 
for example, yet the Iraq War has seen hundreds.  Suicide attackers were absent the First 






iterations of each (Bloom 2005; Crenshaw 2007).  Suicide missions do not appear to be a 
tactic of last resort though, emerging only after conventional means are exhausted.  The 
Tamil Tigers, for example, began using suicide missions in response to a need to reach 
difficult targets (Hopgood 2005).  
 Pape (2005) says that, because they are easily swayed, suicide campaigns only 
target liberal democracies.  Since authoritarian regimes might show no respect for human 
rights or tolerance for political dissent, they might simply eliminate troublesome 
populations that produce suicide attackers.  The data do not agree, however; while Pape 
argues that attacks in Morocco and Saudi Arabia actually targeted the US, the same 
cannot be said for those in Bangladesh and China.  When Jackson and Reiter (2007:344) 
reevaluated Pape’s claim that suicide attacks only target liberal democracies, they found 
only “quite modest” support for it and much stronger support for “[population] size, 
Islam, and the past global experience with suicide terrorism” as causes. 
 This section gave a synopsis of the timing, goals, and effectiveness of suicide 
missions.  While they are an effective means of killing people, suicide attacks are not a 
foolproof means for expelling foreign occupiers; and while they may give weak actors 
more leverage in conflict than they would otherwise have, there is no steadfast way to 
predict their emergence.  The paper now turns to the strategic, individual, social, and 
demographic causes of suicide missions.   
  
Proposed Causes of Suicide Attacks  
 Suicide missions are a complex phenomenon; and like any human behavior, many 






stranger to supposition and unsupported logical leaps, making it difficult to separate truth 
from speculation.  Too often, authors fail to establish causation in phenomena that 
correlate with suicide missions.  This section discusses the proposed causes of suicide 
attacks along with relevant criticism of them:  it is an attempt to weigh the evidence for 
the causes of suicide missions using empirical evidence for substantiation.  This section 
introduces causes in roughly chronological order, according to when they were proposed 
in the scientific literature. 
 Researchers typically discuss the causes of, and motivations for, suicide attacks at 
three interrelated levels:  strategic, social, and individual. Strategic causes can be thought 
of as ultimate goals, like nationalism and political self-determination; they are typically 
applied to organizations.  Social causes include competition between rival political 
groups for membership and funding; they are generally applied to organizations along 
with the local populations they operate within.  Individual causes include personal 
motivations like revenge and humiliation; they are applied to single members of a 
population. The current naming convention is unwieldy and future researchers could 
benefit by disentangling types of motivations from the relative number of people they 
influence.  It is plain to see how a motive like nationalism might at once be a strategic 
motive for individuals, insurgent organizations, and an entire society; yet this distinction 
is rarely noted.   
 While a piecemeal approach is often useful for developing insight on relatively 
new and complex topics, researchers have failed at times to “see the forest through the 
trees” when discussing suicide attacks.  There is no “magic bullet” explanation for all 






missions often ally with the research interests of the authors suggesting them.  For 
example, Pape’s (2005) explanation that nationalism is the “taproot” of suicide missions 
stems from his field of political science.  Many criticize Pape for being too forceful with 
his stance that suicide attacks are rooted in nationalism (see below), especially since he 
has had the ear of policymakers in Washington DC on more than one occasion (Ashworth 
et al. 2008; Atran 2006; Atran 2010; Crenshaw 2007).  It is clear that individual, social, 
and strategic factors all have a hand in producing attackers; denying this is a disservice.   
  
Early Explanations:  Psychology, Poverty, and  
Lack of Education (1993-2003) 
 The persistent stereotype of suicide attackers as uneducated, poor, crazed, 
religious fanatics is tired:  sufficient evidence shows this is not the case.  In fact, the idea 
that suicide attackers are irrational and random only increases their effectiveness as a 
weapon of psychological warfare (Atran 2003b).  Suicide attackers generally better 
educated than the local average, sane, often middle-class, and they may or may not be 
religious (Atran 2003a; Atran 2003b; Atran 2004a; Atran 2004b; Atran 2004d; Atran 
2006; Bloom 2005; Hudson 1999; McDermott 2005; Pape 2003; Pape 2005).   
 Many, including former President G.W. Bush, have assumed a connection among 
poverty, lack of education, and terrorism; however, there is little evidence for this (Pape 
2005).  If such a relationship did exist, sub-Saharan Africa might be a hive of terrorist 
production, but it is not (Krueger 2007; Piazza 2006).   
 While the “conventional wisdom” that poverty leads to suicide attacks has failed 






While here is no link between income inequality and non-suicide terrorism (Krueger 
2007; Piazza 2006), an attempt is made here to look for links between it and suicide 
missions.   
     
Common Factors in Modern Suicide Missions 
 The dismissal of psychological abnormalities, poverty, and lack of education as 
causes of suicide attacks has opened the door for new explanations.  Gambetta (2005) 
identifies six commonalities of suicide missions and the groups who use them; these are 
provided here as primer for the history of ideas to follow.  First, suicide attackers are 
rarely, if ever, lone actors; rather, they are members of groups who act within organized 
conflicts.  Second, the goals and behaviors of groups who use suicide missions vary 
widely; some are religious, some are fiercely nationalistic, and so on.  Third, suicide 
missions are always used in conjunction with other military tactics like sabotage and 
armed resistance.  Fourth, groups employing suicide missions either exist within societies 
that support “radical tactics,” or they operate outside any single community (Ricolfi 
2005:260).  Hezbollah, for example, exists within a single society that supports radical 
actions.  Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, operates across many communities and is less 
influenced by the attitudes of any one in particular.  The point is that “there is no radical 
organization linked to a moderate community that has used [suicide missions]” (Ricolfi 
2005:260); either local communities support suicide missions, or the attacks are ordered 
by leaders who do not heed local norms since they operate outside them.  Fifth, the 
weaker sides of asymmetric conflicts are generally the first to use suicide missions; but 






Tigers adopted suicide missions in the late 1980s, more than 10 years after the 
organization was founded and nearly two decades before its defeat.  Last, Gambetta 
suggests that suicide attacks are only directed at democracies, extending Pape’s (2005) 
claim that suicide campaigns (series of attacks designed to garner concessions) target 
democratic states solely.  The evidence contradicts this point, though; suicide attacks in 
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and by rival Iraqi insurgents 
against each other show that being a democracy is not a prerequisite for being targeted.  
In fact, up to one third of suicide attacks from 1980 to 2006 may have targeted 
nondemocracies (Pedahzur 2006).  Nevertheless, the majority of suicide attacks do target 
democracies, probably because nondemocracies may have relatively little regard for 
human rights and may take a heavy handed approach to deal with dissenters (Pape 2005).  
Ethnic Kurds, for example, used suicide attacks against Turkey, but not against Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq, probably because of his demonstrated contempt for Kurdish human 
rights. 
 
Religion (Early 1990s - Present)  
 Groups that use suicide missions and the individuals that take part in them are 
differently motivated, so overgeneralizing about them is dangerous.  While Pape (2005) 
is dismissive of religion’s role as a “root cause” of suicide missions, Atran (2006:130) is 
skeptical and calls Pape’s analysis “outdated,” “sometimes deeply misleading,” and says 
there are “clear and profound differences” between secular groups motivated by 
nationalism and religious groups motivated by global jihad.  Atran (2006) cites Stern 






resentment and humiliation stemming from what they perceive as Western imperialism in 
Muslim lands.  The goals of jihadist groups, like al-Qaeda, who fight decentralized global 
battles against cultural domination should not be conflated with those of nationalist 
groups, like Hamas, who seek liberation of perceived ethnic homelands.   
 Recognizing this fundamental split in motives is essential to explaining suicide 
missions comprehensively; too often researchers and policy makers have suggested a 
singular cause for them, and in doing so, they may have misguided efforts to stop them.  
There are, in fact, secular nationalists and global jihadis, but are there are not secular 
jihadis or global nationalists.  Jihad is religiously justified conflict (note that this does not 
necessarily mean religiously motivated), while nationalism is based on the actors’ 
perceived rights to a piece of land.  Global jihadis see the entire world as a battlefront, 
not just a single territory or county (Atran 2010).   
 The trouble with understanding the role of religion in all of this is that it blurs the 
lines between group and individual motivations and it is correlated with a wide range of 
non-religious cultural beliefs and practices at the individual and societal levels.  But is 
this something unique to religion?  Secular movements like Marxism blur these lines, too, 
but according to Atran (2010), not as well as religion since they lack a transcendent 
supernatural component that places the struggle in a universal context.   
 In the absence of research focused on untangling how religious belief, terrorism, 
and other cultural factors covary, it seems best to consider the utilitarian role religion 
plays in conflict.  Weisner (1998) suggests that indoctrination leads people to pay less 
attention to kinship loyalties, meaning they are more likely to make group sacrifices.  






kinship in motivating altruism:  militaries encourage “bands of brothers,” and 
parishioners call each other “brothers and sisters,” all “children of God,” their collective 
“Father.”  Such psychological primes might encourage altruism between unrelated group 
members via the same psychological mechanisms that generate it between biological kin 
(Atran 2003a).   
 Sosis and Bressler (2003:228) found that religious communities survive longer 
than secular ones.  Drawing on Rappaport (1971; 1979; 1999), they explain that religious 
beliefs are unfalsifiable and since they “cannot be verified logically, believers verify 
them ‘emotionally.’”  Religion binds believers and separates the sacred from the profane 
in ways secular ideologies cannot and is “the means by which terrorists translate a 
political struggle into a cosmic war” (Sosis and Alcorta 2008:107).  A reliance on the 
supernatural expands the scope of religious movements beyond that of secular ones, like 
environmentalism.   
 Religion is useful for organizing and justifying protracted transnational conflicts 
because it clearly defines group membership across national, racial, and ethnic lines.  It 
also transforms a conflict’s timeframe from something possibly quite short into 
something everlasting (Sosis and Alcorta 2008).  Such transcendence means that al-
Qaeda members might not view themselves as nationals, but as soldiers struggling for all 
humanity, for all time (Atran 2006).  Since they are unified by religion, not citizenship, 
they do not fear “earthly” retaliation because they have no homeland which can be 
retaliated upon (Atran 2006).  
 Although not all suicide attackers are Muslim, Islam is the only religion now 






been the case, though, as the Jewish Sicarii mentioned in the introduction to this paper 
show.  Islam’s current involvement may, however, have more to do with the way the 
religion is organized than with any particular piece of religious doctrine.  Sunni Islam, in 
particular, lacks a strict hierarchy, so its teachings are arguably more open to 
interpretation than those of other religions.  Even if the majority of Muslims believe 
otherwise, a religious leader (imam) may issue a declaration (fatwa) justifying actions, 
even suicide missions.  Islamic scholars with varying degrees of religious esteem have 
issued rulings both denouncing and supporting the use of “martyrdom operations” and 
“terrorism” in general.  It is difficult, then, to say that “Islam supports” or “causes” 
something like terrorism when the fundamental organization of the religion makes it so 
different from more hierarchical faiths.  To say that “Islam” supports something is simply 
not the same as saying “the Vatican” does since there is no Islamic analogue to the Pope.  
American Evangelical Christians face a similar situation; with no infallible human 
figurehead to dictate dogma, they are also open to extremist actions from group members.   
 The role of religion as a potential cause of suicide missions remains hazy and 
further research is desperately needed in this area.  What is clear is that some groups use 
it to rally support and justify their actions; but on its own, religion cannot explain all 
suicide missions.       
 
Nationalism (2003 – Present) 
 Pape (2005) published what was, at the time, the most complete and systematic 
analysis of campaigns using suicide missions.  The goal of this section is not to discount 






cases.  Pape is very forceful in his sentiment that nationalism is the root cause of suicide 
missions, and he downplays the importance of other factors.  Furthermore, he does not 
deal sufficiently with the fact that many occupied countries, like those of colonial Africa, 
have not produced suicide attackers.  
 Pape’s methodology has been criticized by Crenshaw (2007:142), who suggests 
Pape uses an “arbitrary” definition of “military campaign” to purposefully leave out 
“incidents that could be inconvenient to explain.”  This criticism is not unfounded:  at 
times, Pape provides little justification for calling some attacks “isolated” while grouping 
others as parts of “wider campaigns.”  Crenshaw (2007) points to a 1995 truck bombing 
in Egypt as an example:  although the bombing was very likely part of a larger campaign 
by Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Pape claims it was isolated.   
 Additionally, Pape sometimes combines disparate groups together under single 
campaigns, implying they are driven toward the same goals.  In reality, insurgent groups 
fighting in the same conflict may have vastly different objectives. Some Iraqi insurgent 
groups have used suicide attacks with the goal of expelling coalition troops, but others 
have used them against each other in attempts to gain political, social, and financial 
“market share” (Crenshaw 2007). 
 The crux of Pape’s research lies with the idea that that foreign occupation 
precipitates suicide missions.  He defines “occupation” as “the exertion of political 
control over territory by an outside group” (Pape 2003:85), and continues, saying  
 My hypothesis is that the taproot of suicide terrorism is nationalism – the 
belief among members of a community that they share a distinct set of 
ethnic, linguistic, and historical characteristics and are entitled to govern 







The use of suicide missions in Palestine and Sri Lanka supports this hypothesis.  In both 
cases, the ethnic homeland of the group using suicide missions is physically occupied by 
outside forces.  Not every case is so clear-cut though:  according to Pape, al-Qaeda has 
targeted the US over its “occupation” of Saudi Arabia.  While American troops have held 
positions on the Arabian Peninsula since the beginning of Operation Desert Storm in 
1990, no American military effort has been directed at the leadership or citizens of the 
country, and yet 15 of the 19 September 11, 2001 hijackers were Saudi (McDermott 
2005).  If such an “occupation” causes suicide attacks, the term must be interpreted 
broadly, as Atran (2006) notes 
It is quite a stretch to identify the common thread [of the world’s suicide 
attacks] as a secular struggle for foreign occupation of a homeland, unless 
‘secular’ covers transcendent ideologies, ‘foreign occupation’ includes 
tourism, and ‘homeland’ expands to at least three countries (p. 134). 
 
Critics note that Pape does not list Germany, Japan, or South Korea in his list of occupied 
countries (Ashworth et al. 2011).  Is it occupation or the perception of occupation that 
matters?  Pape (2003; 2005) argues for the latter, contending that al-Qaeda views the 
American military presence in Saudi Arabia as occupation.  Good evidence for this 
comes from Osama bin-Laden himself, who issued a statement titled “A Declaration of 
War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places” (1996), in 
which he decries the Saudi establishment for allowing US bases on the Arabian 
Peninsula.   
 Perception cannot explain every case where suicide missions are used, though.  
The Iraq War, for example, saw insurgent groups using suicide attacks against each other 
(Crenshaw 2007).  This presents a problem for the hypothesis that they are always 






“occupation” to include perception weakens value as a predictor of suicide missions 
because perceptions are difficult to quantify.  
 To his credit, Pape notes that a religious difference between occupied and 
occupying forces encourages suicide missions, but he downplays its significance as a 
prime motivator, suggesting instead that its main use is to solidify group affiliation (Pape 
2005).  Such divisional tactics are common in human conflicts (Keeley 1996), but Atran 
disagrees about the importance of religion in suicide missions, saying 
 Most suicide terrorists today are inspired by a global jihadism which, despite 
atavistic cultural elements, is a thoroughly modern movement filling the popular 
political void in Islamic countries left in the wake of discredited Western 
ideologies co-opted by corrupt local governments (2006:139).  
 
Atran’s retort is a reminder that investigators cannot lose track of the wider 
circumstances in their search for a “root cause” of suicide missions.  It seems fair to say 
that if some people can be motivated to die for “sacred” soil, others can be motivated to 
die for transcendent political, filial, or spiritual reasons; this is explored in further detail 
later.    
 A closing comment on Pape’s notion that nationalism is the root cause of suicide 
attacks:  because he makes rigid claims about the quality of his dataset, which he says 
includes “the universe” of suicide attacks, Pape sets himself up for withering criticism.  
The issue with sampling “the universe” of any behavior, especially a rare one, and then 
issuing a “root cause” for it is that the sample will grow and change, making revision 
necessary as new cases come to light.  Ashworth (2011) notes that were Pape’s data 
gathered in 1986, being a member of a Shi’a Muslim group would have been a 






known to use them up to then.  In 1987, the Tamil Tigers adopted the tactic, thus 
changing conditions “necessary” to spark suicide missions.  Ashworth notes  
So being Shi’a, or Muslim, or even religious is not a necessary condition 
for carrying out a suicide attack after all.  And who is to say what groups 
will take it up in the future?  Indeed, Pape’s own argument suggests that 
we should not expect to find any stable necessary condition for suicide 
terror.  One of his main claims is that suicide tactics are spreading in a 
process of social learning (2011:4). 
 
 Pape may be judicious with his selection criteria for occupied countries; he may 
also overstate the claim that occupation is a necessary condition for generating suicide 
attackers; but even his harshest critics, like Atran (2006), acknowledge that nationalism 
has a hand in producing attackers.  The secular LTTE fought under the banner of 
nationalism for the liberation of their ethnic homeland, Tamil Eelam:  this point is not 
under dispute; but to say al-Qaeda is likewise motivated to end the pseudo-occupation of 
the Arabian Peninsula is to go a step too far.  A stated goal of al-Qaeda is to rid Muslim 
countries from Western influence, whether or not they are “occupied.”  Religion may not 
be the primary reason al-Qaeda fights the West; rather, it may be what bonds its 
sympathizers in doing so.     
 
Durkheimian Theory (2003 – Present) 
 Following the dismissal of psychological pathology as a cause for individual 
participation in suicide missions, some researchers looked to Durkheim’s classic 
typology of suicide for insight into the phenomenon.  Durkheim (1952) contends that 
people who are especially over- or under-integrated socially are most likely to commit 
suicide.  He separates their motivations into four types; egoistic, anomic, altruistic, and 






social ties.  Those who commit suicide in these groups are likely to be outcasts lacking 
the individuality valued by society; they have difficulty getting support because of 
society’s weak bonds.  Altruistic suicides happen in societies that are excessively socially 
integrated, where the good of society is placed before that of the individual.  In these 
cases, tremendous pressure to conform and sacrifice leads to suicide.  Anomic suicide 
happens in changing societies where individuals lose social integration; those who cannot 
adapt become disengaged outsiders prone to suicide.  Dismissing it as relatively 
insignificant, Durkheim mentions fatalistic suicide only in a footnote; it occurs where 
social regulations are so pervasive and heavy handed that that individuals feel no purpose 
or hope in their lives (e.g., slavery).   
 Pedahzur et al. (2003) suggest a hybrid classification (fatalistic-altruistic) for 
Palestinian suicide attackers, meaning they:  1) hail from excessively regulated groups 
whose members put the good of society ahead of the individual; and 2) feel personally 
trapped by pressures outside their control.  Evidence supporting the first point comes 
from the fact that relatively high numbers of Palestinian suicide attackers have had 
formal religious training in highly regulated groups emphasizing group sacrifice 
(Pedahzur et al. 2003).  The fact that young, unmarried men comprise the demographic 
group most likely to produce suicide attackers supports the second point; Palestinian 
political decisions are not typically guided by young men’s desires, yet this group is still 
subject to the repercussions of these decisions, especially those dictating war and peace 
(Pedahzur et al. 2003). 
 Zevallos (2006) questions whether Durkheim’s framework is applicable to suicide 






questionably, that making the decision to not kill others while killing oneself is diagnostic 
of “typical” suicide.  Zevallos does not develop this argument further, apart from saying 
that since Durkheim did not mention suicide attacks, his framework is not applicable to 
them; but is this reason enough to discount Durkheim?  Does it matter if someone who 
commits suicide unknowingly puts another in danger?  How much danger must a suicidal 
person put someone else in before they are excluded from classification?  These 
questions remain unanswered.  
Moving past the general applicability of Durkheim’s model to suicide missions, 
Zevallos (2006) argues that suicide attackers do not fit fatalistic-altruistic classification 
forwarded by Pedahzur et al. (2003) because many Palestinian attackers have been 
motivated by personal slights or traumas, suggesting an anomic component to their 
actions.   
Zevallos also suggests that societal support for Palestinian suicide attacks is 
overestimated because terrorist groups, not civilians, often construct murals and 
makeshift shrines for “martyrs.”  If true, this means that the strong societal ties that 
precipitate altruistic suicide may be weaker than Pedahzur et al. (2003) propose.  It may, 
however, also be that such social support comes from members of the attacker’s group 
rather than from local society.  
Durkheim’s classification of suicide types has been applied to people who 
participate in suicide missions.  It has given credibility to the idea that altruism motivates 
some individuals to volunteer for such attacks, which will be explored in greater detail 







Marketing and Outbidding (2005 – Present) 
Social support might be due to a variety of factors:  religion, a mixture of 
religion and nationalism, foreign occupation in general (deﬁned narrowly 
or broadly), speciﬁc practices of opposing governments (for example, 
excessive brutality and civilian casualties), deliberate cultivation by 
political organizations, the failure of other organizations to effectively 
counter the tactic, or long experience of suffering and deprivation (which 
could be related to the length and severity of the conﬂict and perhaps to 
the failure of alternatives).  We do not know how much weight to accord 
each factor or how we might measure them (Crenshaw 2007:153). 
 
In many societies, the individual act of suicide is perceived as taboo and as 
such marked out as a prohibited behavior.  However, when a community 
at large perceives itself to be suffering discrimination, oppression and/or 
marginalization over an extended period of time, a shift can develop in the 
psychological connotations around the act of suicide, when it is presented 
as countering the situation of suffering (Sheehy-Skeffington 2009:6). 
 
The preceding quotes summarize the current understanding of how social support 
influences suicide missions.  Many researchers concur that the tactic is rarely used if 
deemed unacceptable or repugnant by local norms (Atran 2010; Bloom 2005; Kalyvas 
and Sanchez-Cuenca 2005; Pape 2005; Sheehy-Skeffington 2009).  As Crenshaw (2007) 
notes, however, just how much support is necessary, and where it must come from, is 
unclear.  A lack of social support may explain the absence of suicide missions in places 
where suicide is patently unacceptable.  It cannot, however, explain the emergence of the 
tactic everywhere:  87 percent of Pakistanis say suicide bombings are “never justified,” 
while only 17 percent of Palestinians agree (Horowitz 2009), yet suicide attackers hail 
from both places.     
Like any political or religious group, those using suicide missions compete with 
each other for popular support, and losing local “market share” means missing out on the 






marketing tools used to recruit people and gain resources (Bloom 2005).  Suicide 
attackers show a willingness to die for a cause that some find attractive (Atran 2006); 
because of this, they may recruit more adherents than they sacrifice (Bloom 2005).   
Kalyvas and Sanchez-Cuenca (2005) say that the relationship between the social 
support and the use of suicide missions is U-shaped, meaning that very high or very low 
support encourages them.  Late 19th and early 20th century Russian Anarchists, for 
example, operated on the fringes of society and were uninfluenced by local social norms.  
They used suicide missions despite the fact that they lacked social support because they 
were not reliant on the larger society for resources (Kalyvas and Sanchez-Cuenca 2005).  
The case is probably the same for al-Qaeda, which, as a transnational organization, 
operates outside local norms that might dissuade them from using suicide attacks.  
Kalyvas and Sanchez-Cuenca (2005:218) also say, “Most terrorists and insurgent 
organizations depend on more or less active support of a pool of supporters.”  It is these 
supporters who supply the resources to keep such groups going.  Additionally, “a trade-
off exists between the intensity of killing or the selectivity of violence on the one hand 
and popular support on the other” (Kalyvas and Sanchez-Cuenca 2005:219).  This means 
groups must balance their propensity for violence against their supporters’ tolerance for 
it.  According to Kalyvas and Sanchez-Cuenca (2005), the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, 
the leading Basque separatist organization) is, at the organizational level, more violent 
than its supporters, which leads it to temper the use of indiscriminate tactics.  Since 
suicide missions are often indiscriminate, the ETA does not employ them.     
Like the ETA, The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is dependent on local resources 






made many overt attempts to warn authorities of impending bombings; ostensibly saving 
civilian lives in order to preserve their own social esteem.  In the case of suicide 
missions, such early warnings would be counterproductive since stealth is key to their 
success (Kalyvas and Sanchez-Cuenca 2005).   
Societal attitudes change, of course, which can affect the “approval ratings” of 
groups using suicide missions.  In some cases, social pressures have had a direct affect on 
the use of suicide attacks:  the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and Armed Islamic 
Group of Algeria (GIA) stopped using them after public support for them waned 
(Kalyvas and Sanchez-Cuenca 2005; Wyne 2005).   
Depending on the size and structure of the organization, social support can 
influence the use of suicide attacks.  For smaller, localized organizations, a high level of 
support encourages suicide attacks; while larger, transnational, agencies seem less 
influenced by social support.  This is not to say that large groups are immune to public 
sentiment:  in the Muslim world, al Qaeda lost social support, and probably a great deal 
of financial backing, following the 2004 Beslan school massacre which left 334 civilians 
dead, 186 of them children (Bloom 2005).  
 
Parochial Altruism and Other Individual Factors (2010 - Present) 
Echoing the “fatalistic-altruistic” classification of suicide attackers forwarded by 
Pedahzur et al. (2003), Gambetta (2005:270) suggests suicide missions are motivated 
primarily by altruism, saying they, “belong to a family of actions in which people go to 
the extremes of self-sacrifice in the belief that by doing so they will best further the 






address the issues inherent in explanations invoking altruism as a motivation (e.g., 
cheating and collective action problems), but he does circle them, continuing  
Even though we instinctively think of altruism as doing purely good 
deeds, altruism and aggression are not antithetical – in warfare you risk 
your life to help kin, comrades, and country also by killing enemies (p. 
270).   
 
 Atran (2010) refines Gambetta’s notion by qualifying suicide missions as cases of 
“parochial altruism,” or altruism that benefits one’s own group through “hostility” toward 
an outgroup (Choi and Bowles 2007).  According to Atran (2010:297), parochial altruism 
is predicated on fictive kinship, which encourages sacrifice between unrelated people by 
coopting psychological mechanisms originally designed to incite altruism between 
genetically related kin.  Atran says that societies must “cooperate to compete” and that 
individual sacrifices that benefit the group are rewarded.  There is evidence that this is the 
case; indigenous groups are known to confer social rewards, like high status, on good 
warriors and hunters (Chagnon 1988; Hawkes and Bird 2002).   
 The problem with applying such logic to suicide missions is that they nearly 
guarantee the actor will die taking part in an action that could otherwise garner social 
praise.  Atran (2010:303) suggest that this may be caused by a psychological “misfire” 
created when people become so close to non-relatives that they make sacrifices for them, 
which, elsewhere in the animal kingdom, would be reserved for kin.     
 Parochial altruism is a newcomer to the list of causes for suicide attacks; it may 
offer an underlying framework for understanding how feelings of helplessness, 
marginalization, humiliation, loyalty, indoctrination, revenge, and kinship (fictive and 






 A final note:  Bloom (2005) calls the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a “blood feud,” 
driven by revenge; this raises the specter of “cultures of honor” sensu Nisbett and Cohen 
(1996).  It may be that suicide attackers are more likely to come from places where “an 
eye for an eye” is the norm and their feelings are stoked by parochial altruism.  Whether 
they do remains unanswered, but if they are, this could further cloud the role of religion 
as a motivation suicide attacks because religion and honor are tightly intertwined, 
especially in the Middle East (Lewis 1998; Lewis 2001).    
    
Establishing Causality 
It has been difficult for researchers to establish “root” causes of suicide attacks.  
The challenge is largely affected by the complexity of establishing causality between the 
presence of suicide missions and its correlates.  Things are further complicated by the 
trouble of identifying and using proper control samples.  If nationalism, religion, or any 
other independent factor hypothetically causes suicide missions, a meaningful statistical 
analysis requires sufficient controls; yet these are not always available.  Both secular and 
religious groups, for example, use suicide missions; unfortunately, even ostensibly 
secular groups operate within religious societies and are likely comprised of religious 
individuals.  This fact makes teasing out the effects of religion on suicide missions 
particularly vexing since the world has no non-religious societies to use in a control 
sample (Purzycki and Gibson 2011).  Religion also covaries with ethnicity, culture, and 
geography; further obfuscating the roles each play in causing suicide attacks (Purzycki 
and Gibson 2011).  Furthermore, aside from appeals to the supernatural, there is nothing 






on.  While religion may facilitate suicide missions (by denoting group affiliation, etc.) it 
is not clear it causes them (Atran 2010; Purzycki and Gibson 2011).  Perhaps the easiest 
way to illustrate this point is to consider whether suicide attacks could exist if there were 
no religion in the world.  They certainly could:  as with violence in general, there are 
many causes of suicide attacks; so suggesting only one thing, like religion or nationalism, 
leads to them is an exercise in futility.  This practice is widespread, however; Dawkins 
(2006) suggests in press and on paper that religious faith is the only thing that could have 
motivated the 2005 London Underground suicide bombers.  Some secular groups use 
suicide missions though, which undermines Dawkins’s stance.  Suicide attacks are 
politically and emotionally charged events and their causes have garnered wide 
speculation from experts, politicians, and the media.  One of the central roles of science is 
to establish causation in correlated events, and doing this means framing statements like 
Dawkins’s as hypotheses, not facts, then testing them against data (Purzycki and Gibson 
2011).  
 Which of the causes discussed earlier are empirically supported?  According to 
verifiable sources and data, suicide attacks kill more people per attack than conventional 
terrorism; they are relatively inexpensive and allow groups to target individuals and 
installations that might otherwise be impossible to access; they also demonstrate a 
profound willingness to die for a cause that may result in increase recruitment.   
 Suicide missions can be an effective part of military campaigns, but there is no 
consensus on whether they are more effective than traditional means; they have been 
used in campaigns that successfully repealed occupiers, but this is probably not the goal 






traditional methods of “terrorism” or guerilla warfare have been exhausted; they exist as 
compliments to other tactics and are used as parts of organized political and military 
conflicts.   
 For relatively small groups pursuing nationalistic goals, local social support is 
important; but for large, multinational groups, the whims of their member’s neighbors are 
less important influences on their actions.  Nationalism is a significant motivator for 
suicide missions, although religious and political ideologies, such as Salafism and 
anarchism also encourage them.  Religion plays a role in suicide missions, but not in a 
simple way:  as it does in other types of conflict, religion draws strong divisions between 
groups and offers a moral justification for killing.  Religion often covaries with race, 
ethnicity, and language, and it is probably be the case that in a world absent of religion, 
some other physical or cultural characteristic would assume its role as divider.  How 
exactly religious, nationalistic, and political factors intermingle as causes of suicide 
attacks remains unclear and likely differs according to which group or conflict is under 
study.    
 There is no single diagnostic for who becomes a suicide attacker.  A wide age 
range of men and women of various nationalities, ethnicities, religions, and cultural 
backgrounds have participated in suicide missions.  The majority of attackers, however, 
are young men who are possibly influenced by small group dynamics such as friendship 
and fictive kinship along with larger ideological goals.   
 In light of the evolutionary expectation that young men are the most risk prone 






populations with male-biased operational sex ratios or high numbers of young men to old 
are more likely than others to produce suicide attackers  
 
A Note on Female Suicide Attackers 
 Fourteen percent of the suicide attackers identified in this study were women, a 
figure nearly identical to Pape’s (2005) figure of 15 percent. Although the majority of 
suicide attackers are young men, the ratio of male to female attackers differs by conflict 
(Hafez and United States Institute of Peace 2007; Pape 2005; Ricolfi 2005) largely 
because conservative religious groups bar female participation while Marxist groups 
encourage female attackers to portray the socialist ideal (Pape 2005).   
 Female attackers enjoy some pragmatic advantages over men; they can wear more 
clothing, fake pregnancies to conceal explosives, and arouse less suspicion in general.  
Many women have participated in Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), LTTE, and Chechen 
suicide missions; but they represent the minority in most campaigns, especially those 
spearheaded by religiously conservative groups.   
  Anecdotal evidence suggests female attackers are motivated more by personal 
affronts and revenge than nationalism or religion.  In last wills and testaments, many have 
cited the death of a loved one or rape as justifications for their actions (Bloom 2005; Pape 
2005); men, on the other hand, more often point to political or nationalistic motivations 
(Atran 2010).   Where rape victims face especially strong social stigmas, the individual 
costs of suicide missions might rebalance in the face of diminished reproductive and 






human bomb is an understood and accepted offering for a woman who will never be a 
mother,” and also notes that married Black Tigers are “extremely rare.”    
 Pape (2005:209) found that the 261 Hezbollah, Palestinian, LTTE, Chechen, and 
PKK female suicide attackers he identified were significantly older than their male 
counterparts, although they still averaged less than 30.  He suggests that these older 
women may have had fewer opportunities to marry, making them more likely to 
volunteer for suicide missions.  As compelling as these accounts of female suicide attacks 
are, much more research is needed to get to the root of the phenomenon.  The current 












HYPOTHESES AND METHODS 
 
Hypotheses 
 Male reproduction is constrained by the number of reproductively aged females 
and competing males in a population.  Where the operational sex ratio is high, male 
reproductive prospects are relatively low, which lowers the individual fitness cost of 
suicide missions because reproduction is less likely for the individual.  High young-old 
ratio indicates greater young male-male competition and lower reproductive prospects for 
these men.  Under these theoretical assumptions, the following four hypotheses are tested 
here: 
 
1) suicide attackers are more likely to come from areas with higher operational 
sex ratios than from areas with lower ratios,  
2) among those areas that do produce suicide attackers, those with higher 
operational sex ratios produce more than areas with lower ratios, 
3) suicide attackers are more likely to come from areas with high young-old ratios 
than lower ratios, and  
4) among those areas that do produce suicide attackers, those with higher young-







 This dissertation uses two datasets; the first contains information on individual 
suicide attackers, the second on the countries that produced them, along with data for 
control countries that did not produce any.  Creating the “individual” dataset required 
piecing together three smaller samples from Pape (2005), Gambetta and Tzvetkova 
(2005), and Hafez (2007).  Pape, Gambetta, and Tzvetkova summarized attacks, while 
Hafez described individual attackers.   
 The Gambetta and Tzvetkova dataset was used as a starting point because it was 
the best available at the commencement of research.  By one estimate, the “universe” of 
attacks assembled by Pape (2005) overlooks about 50% of incidents (Ricolfi 2005), and 
Hafez’s full dataset is unpublished, so I requested and received a copy in the Fall of 2010.  
Hafez investigated 2,095 attackers who acted from 1981 through 2008, Gambetta and 
Tzvetkova described 598 attacks from 1982 to 2006, while Pape looked at 315 incidents 
from 1980 to 2003.  The dataset presented here contains information on 1,208 suicide 
attackers who acted from 1981 to 2007.   
 Each attack was verified with news reports from LexisNexis.  These varied in 
completeness, and included such information as:  the number of attackers present; their 
ages; sexes; names; nationalities; and current residences.  Where LexisNexis failed to 
return results, Google searches were used; however, these were only added to the data if 
they came from a credible news source like a daily newspaper.  A website 
(http://www.tamilnation.org/) listing the names, biographies, birthdates and death dates 
for 240 Black Tigers was used to corroborate LTTE attacks.  The dataset includes a 










Suicide Attacker Production 
 The suicide attacker production variable is binary and indicates whether each of 
the 219 nations and regions in the dataset produced one or more suicide attacker between 
1981 and 2007.   
 
Suicide Attacker Production Rate 
 This variable is the logged rate of suicide attacker production per 100,000 people 
in the population for the years 1980 to 2007.  It was calculated using the total population 
of each country as of July, 2010.   
 
Independent Variables 
Operational Sex Ratio and Young Old Ratio 
 Operational Sex Ratio (OSR) is the number of reproductively aged men (20-55 
years old) in a population relative to the number of reproductively aged women (15-40 
years old) in the same population.  Young old ratio (YOR) is the ratio of “young” (15-29 
years old) to “old” (30 years and older) men in the same population.   
  Values for OSR and YOR were computed for 217 countries and two smaller 
regions (the West Bank and Gaza) using population data from the US Census Bureau 






 OSR and YOR are dynamic, and since the dataset includes attacks occurring from 
1981 to 2007, multiple values were computed and averaged for those countries or regions 
that produced more than one attacker.  In other words, the values figured for each attack 
reflected the OSR and YOR of the attacker’s origin country during the year of the attack.  
OSR and YOR values for the control countries were calculated for 2009, the most recent 
year available.   
 Values for the control countries could have been figured using a rolling average, 
but there was no clear way to determine which years to include in the average for each 
country.  If, for example, attackers hailed from Country A from 1990 to 1995 and 
Country B from 1993 to 1997, would control Country C reflect 1990 to 1995, 1993 to 
1997, or 1990 to 1997?  When the control group includes every country in the world that 
has not produced suicide attackers, things quickly become paralyzingly complicated.  To 
mitigate these issues, the control sample relies on the law of averages for all countries 
that did not produce attackers up to 2007.   
 
Muslim Percent 
 This variable describes the percentage of Muslims in the total population of each 
of 232 countries and regions as calculated by the Pew Research Center.  It is included 
here as a control for the possible influence of Islam on the production of suicide 
attackers.  The measure was developed using “about 1,500 sources including census 
reports, demographic studies, and general population surveys” (Pew Research Center 








 The WomanStats project includes McDermott’s 2010 rating of polygyny practices 
for 176 countries.  It is included here as a control for the effects of polygyny on suicide 
attacker production.  McDermott rated polygyny on an ordinal, five point scale; it can be 
found in the WomanStats project as the variable “PW SCALE 1.”   
 
Democracy Index 
 The Economist Intelligence Unit produces the Democracy Index, a measure 
created from 60 variables including voter freedom, voter security, influence of outside 
governments on national affairs, and so on.  It is included here to control for the role of 
democracy, or lack thereof, on attacker production.  The Democracy Index ranges from 
zero to 10, with North Korea ranking lowest, at 1.08, and Norway ranking highest at 9.8 
(Kekic 2007).  The 2006 Democracy Index used here contains values for 167 countries. 
  
Gini Index 
 The Gini Index indicates how much the income of an average citizen or 
household differs from parity.  A score of zero indicates perfect equality, while a score of 
100 represents perfect inequality.  As of 2009 Sweden and Namibia have the world’s 
highest and lowest Gini scores, at 23 and 70.7, respectively (National Foreign 
Assessment Center (U.S.) and United States Central Intelligence Agency 2010).  The 









 To control for the fact that larger populations might have more people willing to 
volunteer for SMs, the dataset includes the total populations of 218 countries.  Estimates 
from July 2010 were used (National Foreign Assessment Center (U.S.) and United States 
Central Intelligence Agency 2010).   
 
Gross National Product (GNP) 
 GNP is the value of all monetary production by the citizens of a country.  To 
control for the possibility that poor countries might be more apt to produce suicide 
attackers, the 2010 gross national products (GNPs) of 203 countries are included in the 
analysis (National Foreign Assessment Center (U.S.) and United States Central 
Intelligence Agency 2010).   
 
Gross National Product (GNP) Per Capita 
 GNP per capita is the GNP of a country divided by the total population of that 
country.  It is included for 199 countries here as an additional control for the effects of 




 To control for the possibility that regional cultures or conditions factor into 
suicide attacker production, the latitudinal midpoint of 219 countries was included as a 






Intelligence Agency 2010).  For reasons discussed later, this variable was dropped from 
the final analysis.   
 
Suicide Rate (Male and Female) 
 To control for the possibility that suicide attackers come from populations where 
suicide is common, the suicide rate per 100,000 individuals was included for 99 countries 
(World Health Organization 2003).  Rates are from the nearest available year up to 2003 
and include separate variables for men and women.  For reasons discussed later, this 
variable was dropped from the final analysis.  
 
Statistical Tests and Techniques 
 This research examines two dependent variables.  The first, the presence of 
suicide attackers, is binary and indicates whether a country produced an attacker from 
1982 to 2007.  The second variable is continuous and describes the number of suicide 
attackers produced by a country per 100,000 people for the same timeframe.  These 
dependent variables require two types of analysis; binary logistic regression using 
maximum likelihood for the former and linear regression for the latter.  All statistics were 
figured with Stata 11 (StataCorp 2009).   
 
Model and Data Selection 
 Traditional model selection involves testing different sets of independent 
variables against data in a theoretically informed way, and then choosing the model 






even a relatively small number of independent variables can be combined in dozens of 
ways.  For example, there are 211, or 2,048 possible combinations of this study’s 
independent variables.   
 Stepwise regression fills this gap, but the technique is widely criticized as an 
atheoretical, “data mining,” approach.  Since stepwise regression compares all possible 
variable combinations, no theory is needed to choose the “best” model.  Furthermore, R2 
is generally used to compare stepwise models and those with higher R2 considered “best.”  
There are issues with this reasoning, however, because R2 generally rewards models with 
more independent variables.  It is not always best to reward complex models in light of 
the fact that more parsimonious models may best reflect reality (Johnson and Omland 
2004).    
Since the 1970s, information criteria (IC) like Akaike’s Information Criterion 
(AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) have become popular model selection 
tools in many disciplines.  Essentially, these IC return Occam’s Razor to model selection.  
Figure 4, adapted from Brurnham and Anderson (2002), illustrates the theory of 
parsimony, upon which these IC are based.  
Models with too few parameters may be biased, and those with too many may 
lead to spurious results (Burnham and Anderson 2004).   AIC and BIC work by 
penalizing models for including more variables, and thus more variance or “noise.”  In 

















 Bias-Variance Tradeoff 
 
 
 The equations used to calculate AIC and BIC are 
 
       AIC = -2*ln(L) + 2*k                                                    (2) 
 
                                                   BIC = -2*ln(L) + ln(N)*k                                              (3) 
 
where L is likelihood, k is the number of parameters estimated in the model, and N is the 
number of observations (Akaike 1974; Shtatland et al. 2001; StataCorp 2009).  Models 






ecology and evolution, so it is used here (Johnson and Omland 2004).  Additionally, AIC 
and BIC agree in all but one of their “picks” of the forthcoming models. 
 Information criteria can be used to compare two or more models given that: 1) 
maximum likelihood is calculated; and 2) the models use the same dataset.  The second 
requirement brings up an important point regarding missing data.  Consider a 
hypothetical situation familiar to many anthropologists; a dataset with ten independent 
variables and 100 cases, some with missing data.  Eight variables contain complete data, 
one variable is missing data for five cases, and one is missing data for 25 cases.  
Assuming no systematic bias in the missing data, a researcher using stepwise regression 
might overlook this it in order to maximize sample size.  Alternatively, they might drop 
cases with missing data in favor of a more consistent dataset, but at the cost of a smaller 
sample. In the latter scenario, do the resultant data (with 75 cases) constitute a separate 
dataset from the original, 100 case one?  Technically, yes: which means IC should not be 
used to compare against one another results generated by these datasets.   
 Put differently, if all 10 independent variables were evaluated against a dependent 
variable using the complete dataset (with 10 variables and 100 cases, some missing data), 
any model that used an independent variable with missing data would be tested on a 
technically different dataset.  Many smaller models would use all 100 cases, but any one 
that included an independent variable with missing data would drop from five to 30 
cases; five for one variable with missing data, 25 for the other, and up to 30 combined.  
Since this would cause sample size (N) to vary, the IC generated by the models would not 






Datasets that maximize sample size while maintaining important independent variables 
should be favored.   
 Here, the full dataset contains 11 independent and two dependent variables, many 
of which are missing data.  Making the data complete requires either keeping all variables 
and dropping all cases with missing data, or dropping variables with missing data, then 
dropping the remaining cases with missing data.  Where some variables are theoretically 
less sound, the latter method makes more sense because it maximizes the number of cases 














Descriptive and Univariate Statistics 
Suicide Attackers 
 Table 1 describes 1,208 suicide attackers who acted from December 15, 1981 to 
November 22, 2007.  Statistics are grouped by sex and given in total; n varies with 
missing data.  The variables “OSR Origin” and “YOR Origin” indicate the values of OSR 
and YOR for the attacker’s country of origin, while “OSR Location” and “YOR 
Location” indicate the representative values of YOR and OSR in the places attacks 
occurred. 
 As expected, most attackers were young males and attacks by men killed nearly 
twice the number of people on average as those by women; a figure skewed by the all-
male 9/11 attacks, which killed 2,752.  The average attacker came from a country with an 
OSR and YOR on par with the world average of 1.19 and 0.78, respectively; however, 
male attackers came from regions with significantly higher YORs than female attackers (t 
= 6.12, n = 479, df = 581, p < .0001, one-tailed), adding weight to the argument that men 
and women are differently motivated to participate in suicide missions.  Relative to 
women, males also attacked regions with significantly lower OSRs (t = -3.19, n = 948, df 















Descriptive Statistics of Attackersa 
Variable n Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Sex 974 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Male 835 
Female 139 
Number Killed 790 14.93 100.18 0 2752 
By Males 558 17.58 118.82 0 2752 
By Females 69 8.80 11.86 0 59 
Age at Death 419 22.66 4.73 0 57 
Male 319 22.77 4.17 13 55 
Female 93 22.90 5.44 16 57 
OSR Origin 638 1.16 0.19 0.81 3.10 
Male 479 1.15 0.19 0.81 3.10 
Female 104 1.24 0.09 0.89 1.39 
YOR Origin 638 0.78 0.18 0.26 1.20 
Male 479 0.79* 0.19 0.26 1.20 
Female 104 0.67 0.11 0.50 1.03 
OSR Location 1122 1.11 0.14 0.81 2.95 
Male 810 1.11* 0.14 0.81 2.95 
Female 138 1.15 0.12 0.87 1.39 
YOR Location 1122 0.79 0.21 0.45 1.32 
Male 810 0.80* 0.21 0.45 1.26 
Female 138 0.67 0.14 0.49 1.32 





tailed), which supports the finding that high YOR is positively associated with conflict 
(Mesquida and Weiner 1999).  Conflict is more common where YOR is high, and male 
suicide attackers are drawn to these places.  If motivated by personal reasons, female  
attackers may be more likely to stay closer to home.   
 
Countries 
 Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for 219 countries and regions of the world.  In 
addition to overall statistics, information for each independent variable is broken down 
into averages for countries that produced suicide attackers and those that did not. 
 Countries with large Muslim populations were more likely to produce attackers 
than those with smaller ones (t = -7.57, n = 216, df = 214, p < .0001, one-tailed), and 
67% of countries with Muslim majorities produced attackers, compared to 7% of 
countries with Muslim minorities.  Attackers were more likely to come from latitudes 
with significantly higher absolute values (t = -2.95, n = 209, df = 207, p = .0018, one-
tailed).  Attackers came from countries where polygyny was more common (z = 1.93, n = 
176, p = .027, one-tailed), and where OSR was higher (t = -1.73, n = 216, df = 214, p = 
0.043, one-tailed).  Less democratic countries (t = 1.79, n = 167, df = 165, p = 0.038, one-
tailed) with higher populations (t = -4.68, n = 218, df = 216, p < .0001, one-tailed) and 
higher GNPs (t = -1.70, n = 203, df = 201, p = 0.045, one-tailed) were also more prone to 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Comparing model IC requires identical datasets.  Table 3 describes results from 
three of the many possible datasets that could have been used in this analysis. The “All 
Data” dataset (n = 219) includes all cases and variables regardless of missing values.  The 
“No Missing Data” dataset is “perfect” and contains no missing data for any of the 
independent variables of interest; however, it contains only 80 cases.  This 37% loss of 
data is distressing: in order to recover some of the lost cases, three independent variables 
(latitude, male suicide rate, and female suicide rate) were dropped, creating the “Optimal 
Dataset” (n = 130).  These variables were excluded because they were: 1) the least 
theoretically important to this research; 2) missing data for up to 55% of cases; and 3), in 
the case of male and female suicide rates, had values not significantly different for 
attacker-producing and non-attacker-producing countries according to univariate tests.  
Removing these variables introduced 52 additional cases to the dataset, and is reasonable 
considering none had significant effects in the full model using either of the other 
datasets.   
 To illustrate the effects of these changes, Table 3 shows results of analyses run on 
all three datasets; BIC and pseudo R2 are also included to show how their influences.  The 
traditional measure for stepwise regression, pseudo R2, favors models with more 
independent variables (parameters), while AIC and BIC select more parsimonious models
for the “Optimal Data” and “No Missing Data” datasets.  For the “All Data” dataset, AIC 
and BIC also favor more complex models because N and L increase, but recall that 
comparing these values is useless, as they are based on different datasets.  For the 
remainder of the paper, only AIC will be reported because it is the most widely used  
57 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































information criterion in studies of ecology and evolution (Johnson and Omland 2004).    
 The models in Table 3 used the production of suicide attackers as the dependent 
variable.  The simplest model included just one independent variable, OSR, to which 
independent variables were added, in order of their assumed theoretical importance, until 
the full model was reached.  In Table 3, as in general, a difference in AIC of two or less 
indicates that the starting model (with the lowest AIC) and alternative models are nearly 
equally likely to represent the true model.  A change in AIC of four to seven suggests 
substantially less support for the alternative model, and a change of more than this 
indicates little or no support for the alternative (Burnham and Anderson 2004). 
 Table 4 shows the best model (AIC = 86.49) using the “Optimal” dataset.  Its 
independent variables are OSR, polygyny scale, percent of the population that is Muslim, 
total population, Gini Index, and GNP.  Of these, all but the last two are significant 
predictors of suicide attacker production.   The remainder of the paper follows this 
pattern, where a model is chosen using AIC and then presented in full. 
 Table 5 shows a model comparison using AIC and the “Optimal Dataset.”  The 
selected model, shown in Table 6, includes YOR, polygyny scale, percent of the 
population that is Muslim, total population, and Gini Index. Of these, YOR, percent of 
the population that is Muslim, and total population size are significant predictors, 
although the effect of YOR is marginal at p = 0.077.  Surprisingly, YOR is signed 
opposite the prediction; countries with lower YORs are more likely to produce suicide 
attackers with the aforementioned controls in place.
59 
   
 











































































































































































































































































































Selection of Logistic Regression Model for Young-Old Ratio and  
 
Production of Suicide Attackers Using AIC 
Independent Variable AIC (Optimal Data) 
YOR 118.91 
+ Polygyny Scale 106.35 
+ Muslim Percent 100.50 
+ Gini Coefficient 102.19 
+ Population 91.68 
+ GNP Overall 92.19 
+ GNP Per Capita 93.05 











   
 











































































































































































































































































Number of Attackers by Country 
 The results show that OSR and YOR have significant effects on whether countries 
produce suicide attackers, but do these ratios also influence how many these regions 
produce?  A word of caution is necessary here:  while the data are very clear on whether a 
country produces attackers, they are much less so about how many they produce.  This is 
because of bias in the information available on individual attackers; many Palestinian 
groups and the LTTE are open about naming them, but al-Qaeda is not.  Sri Lanka and 
the Palestinian territories are therefore likely overrepresented in the data.  Furthermore, 
this study assumes that OSR and YOR motivate male suicide attackers.  Technically, this 
means all females should be dropped from the analysis.  Since information on sex was 
relatively rare, however, regressions were run on the total number of attackers produced.  
This increased sample size, but introduced some noise into the analysis as about 15% of 
the attackers in the data were women; mostly from the LTTE (see Table 7).  For added 
redundancy, the regressions were also run after dropping Sri Lanka from the dataset.  
 The model selection methods used earlier lend themselves to standard least-
squares regressions on attacker production rate.  Table 8 shows the comparison of models 
predicting the number of suicide attackers produced by a country or region; in it, the last 
three models have substantial support relative to each other.  
 The model, shown in Table 9, includes OSR, polygyny scale, percent of the 
population that is Muslim, Gini Index, total population, GNP, GNP per capita, and 
Democracy Index as independent variables; of these, Gini Index, GNP, and Democracy 









Number of Suicide Attackers Generated by Country
  
Country Total Known Male Known Female 
Afghanistan 2 2  
Algeria 4 4  
Bangladesh 1   
Belgium 2   
China 2   
Egypt 7 2  
France 2   
Gaza 9 3  
India 6 2  
Indonesia 2 1  
Iran 2   
Iraq 23 5 1 
Israel 2  1 
Italy 8   
Jordan 5 1  
Kenya 1 1  
Kuwait 7 2  
Lebanon 13 9 5 
Libya 3 2  
Morocco 9 1  
Pakistan 1   
Palestine 35 6 4 
Russian Federation 14  7 
Saudi Arabia 80 18  
Spain 2   
Sri Lanka 297 38 78 
Syria 10 4  
Tunisia 1   
Turkey 13 5 5 
UAE 1   
United Kingdom 3   
West Bank 62 8 2 


















Model Comparison of Linear Regressions for Operational Sex Ratio and  
 
Suicide Attacker Production Rate per 100,000 Peoplea 
Variable AIC (Optimal Data) 
Operational Sex Ratio 91.95 
+ Polygyny Scale 92.11 
+ Muslim Percent 94.09 
+ Gini Coefficient 93.23 
+ Population 75.10 
+ GNP Overall 70.80 
+ GNP Per Capita 70.27 
+ Democracy Index 70.97 













































































































































































































































































































































marginally significant.  Surprisingly, though, polygyny and population are negatively 
associated with the number of attackers a country produces.   Dropping Sri Lanka from 
the analysis preserves only population as a significant, negative, predictor, suggesting Sri 
Lanka has an overwhelming influence on the model.    
 Table 10 shows model selection information for the effect of YOR on the rate of 
attacker production and the full model is shown in Table 11.  Since the number of Sri 
Lankan attackers is overrepresented in the data, Table 12 and Table 13 show the effects 
of dropping Sri Lanka from the analysis. 
  This marks the end of hypotheses testing; operational sex ratio and young-old are 
significant predictors of whether a country produces suicide attackers, although neither 
predicts the rate at which they do.  Lower YOR is unexpectedly associated with greater 
likelihood of attacker production, while OSR behaves as predicted.  These results will be 
discussed in the final chapter.     
 
Predictive Model 
 Paraphrasing Box and Draper (1987:424), “All models are wrong, but some are 
useful.”  It is clear that OSR and YOR are influential in suicide attacker production; but 
can they usefully predict which countries but might generate them in the future?  This 
section explores this question.   
 Logistic regression predicts probabilities of group membership as long as all 
variables contain complete data.  Without this, cases enter the regression equation as 
zeros, causing it to fail.  Leaving data “on the table” because of missing cases is 












































































Model Comparison of Linear Regressions for Young- Old Ratio and Suicide  
 
Attacker Production Rate per 100,000 Peoplea 
Variable AIC (Optimal Data) 
YOR 91.96 
+ Polygyny Scale 92.33 
+ Muslim Percent 94.33 
+ Gini Coefficient 93.06 
+ Population 75.12 
+ GNP Overall 73.73 
+ GNP Per Capita 70.85 
+ Democracy Index 71.09 
an = 21 
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data using regression. 
 The nature of MI is speculative, so it was not used to generate formal models 
throughout this paper, but it is useful in this more exploratory section. Data were imputed 
for two variables; polygyny scale and Gini Index.  OSR was used to impute missing data 
for Gini Index (n = 134, F = 50.10, p = <.0001, R2 = .2751) and YOR was used for 
polygyny scale (n = 174, F = 75.89, p = <.0001, pseudo R2 = .1562).   
As before, model selection is made using AIC.   This time, OSR and YOR were included 
together in the same models as independent variables.  This would not have been 
theoretically prudent before because there was no justification for controlling YOR in 
tests of OSR or vice versa; but the point of this exercise is to predict group membership, 
not test hypotheses, so including both is now justifiable.   
 Table 14 shows the model selection results and Table 15, the chosen model.  
Table 16 lists countries that have a more than one in five probability of producing a 
suicide attacker according to nonimputed data, while Table 17 shows the same thing for 
imputed data.  In Table 17, countries that appear in predictions with both non-imputed 
and imputed data are italicized.  
 Table 17 contains predictions made using data up to 2007.  According to the 
imputed data, the five countries most likely to produce suicide attackers are Qatar, 
Nigeria, Bahrain, Oman and Azerbaijan.  Since 2007, have these countries produced 
them?  As of February 15, 2011 LexisNexis searches of all world newspapers show no 
evidence of Qatari or Bahraini attackers, but the current unrest in Bahrain may make it 
fertile territory for them in the near future. 











Model Selection for Prediction of Suicide Attackersa 
Independent Variable AIC (Optimal Data) 
OSR 118.07 
+YOR 119.62 
+ Polygyny Scale 105.94 
+ Muslim Percent 97.69 
+ Gini Coefficient 99.67 
+ Population 89.35 
+ GDP Overall 88.32 
+ GDP Per Capita 89.97 
+ Democracy Index 90.89 
an = 132 
   
 



































































































































































































































































































Predicted Probability of Suicide Attacker Production Using Non-Imputed Data 
Country  Probability Suicide Attackers Present (2007) 
Finland 0.21 No 
United States 0.22 No 
Albania 0.25 No 
Mali 0.28 No 
Brazil 0.29 No 
Niger 0.29 No 
Gambia 0.29 No 
Jordan 0.30 Yes 
Kyrgyzstan 0.31 No 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.31 No 
Italy 0.31 Yes 
United Kingdom 0.32 Yes 
Austria 0.33 No 
Senegal 0.33 No 
Guinea 0.34 No 
Belgium 0.35 Yes 
Kosovo 0.36 No 
Canada 0.36 No 
Germany 0.39 No 
Tunisia 0.39 Yes 
France 0.41 Yes 
Yemen 0.42 Yes 
Algeria 0.42 Yes 
Morocco 0.49 Yes 
Azerbaijan 0.51 No 
Bangladesh 0.67 Yes 
Egypt 0.71 Yes 
Russian Federation 0.77 Yes 
Turkey 0.78 Yes 
Nigeria 0.79 No 
Pakistan 0.92 Yes 
Indonesia 0.98 Yes 
India 1.00 Yes 







Predicted Probability of Suicide Attacker Production Using Imputed Data 
Country Probability Suicide Attackers Present (2007) 
Sudan 0.22 No 
Malaysia 0.23 No 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.23 No 
Maldives 0.25 No 
Guinea 0.26 No 
Brunei 0.26 No 
Niger 0.28 No 
Kyrgyzstan 0.29 No 
Jordan 0.29 Yes 
Mauritania 0.30 No 
Senegal 0.32 No 
Turkmenistan 0.32 No 
Somalia 0.34 No 
Yemen 0.34 Yes 
Kosovo 0.34 No 
Gambia 0.35 No 
Algeria 0.35 Yes 
West Bank 0.36 Yes 
Djibouti 0.36 No 
Syria 0.37 Yes 
Albania 0.39 No 
Comoros 0.41 No 
Libya 0.41 Yes 
Russian Federation 0.43 Yes 
United States 0.44 No 
Uzbekistan 0.44 No 
Iraq 0.46 Yes 
Brazil 0.53 No 
Azerbaijan 0.53 No 
Oman 0.54 No 
Bahrain 0.54 No 
Tunisia 0.54 Yes 
Saudi Arabia 0.54 Yes 






Table 17 continued 
   
Country Probability Suicide Attackers Present (2007) 
Morocco 0.57 Yes 
Kuwait 0.59 Yes 
Afghanistan 0.65 Yes 
Qatar 0.71 No 
United Arab Emi 0.73 Yes 
Egypt 0.76 Yes 
Turkey 0.77 Yes 
Bangladesh 0.92 Yes 
Pakistan 0.94 Yes 
Indonesia 0.98 Yes 
China 1.00 Yes 



















 “Underwear Bomber,” attempted to blow up an American airliner on December 25, 2009 
(Whittell and Fresco 2009).  On July 28, 2010, a man became the first Omani attacker 
when he used a suicide boat to attack a Japanese tanker docked in the United Arab 
Emirates (Coker 2010).  On April 30, 2009, an ethnic Azerbaijani with Georgian 
citizenship killed 12 people before committing suicide at a university in Baku, Azerbaijan 
(CNN 2009). He had moved to Azerbaijan four years before the attack (Today.az 2009) 
and an investigation indicated he was not a lone actor, but was involved in a larger, 
organized, terrorist operation (Azeri-Press Agency 2010).  Later in 2009, another 
Azerbaijani citizen blew himself up with a grenade in an apparent suicide attack, injuring 
one (Azeri-Press Agency 2009).   
 Conservatively, the model predicted 79 percent of the countries with a greater 
than a “coin toss” (0.50) likelihood of producing attackers; if the nearly successful Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab is included, the figure jumps to 84 percent.  Based on these 











DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Those who believe suicide terrorism can be explained by a single political root 
cause, such as the presence of foreign military forces or the absence of 
democracy, ignore psychological motivations, including religious inspirations, 
which can trump rational self-interest to produce horrific or heroic behavior in 
ordinary people (Atran 2006:144). 
 
There is no one explanation for all suicide attacks or single “necessary” condition 
for them.  Like many human behaviors, they result from a complex interplay of internal 
and external forces.  Prior research has focused on the role of altruism, humiliation, 
poverty, education, religion, nationalism, and more in suicide missions.  This dissertation 
adds operational sex ratio, young-old ratio, polygyny, percentage of the population that is 
Muslim, and population size to this list.  This section discusses how these factors might 
interplay to produce suicide attackers and is couched in the notion that a general lack of 
economic, marriage, and social alternatives leads to suicide missions.   
  
Psychology 
 Populations with higher OSRs are more likely to produce male suicide attackers, a 
finding anticipated in the curiously titled paper "The Evolutionary Psychological 
Imagination: Why You Can't Get a Date on Saturday Night and Why Most Suicide 





by 1) competition between males which is exacerbated by polygyny; and 2) the prospect 
of 72 virgins in the afterlife.   
 Kanazawa’s paper is speculative and presents no original data, but this 
dissertation supports his polygyny hypothesis: polygynous countries are more likely to 
produce suicide attackers, all else equal.  High operational sex ratio only adds to the 
effect of polygyny in reducing the number of available females in these places. 
 Kanazawa makes what, at times, appear to be outlandish and insensitive 
statements.  He suggests that Muslim suicide attackers are analogous to Western men 
who spend their Saturday nights home watching pornography.  The “Stone Age” minds 
of these societal and reproductive “losers” do not understand that pixels on a computer 
screen are not real people or that 72 virgins may not really be waiting for them in the 
hereafter.   
 It is widely accepted that most humans currently live under evolutionarily novel 
conditions, yet the pornography analogy seems a stretch.  Kanazawa eschews many facts 
in his argument, among them is that not all places with Muslim majorities and legal 
polygyny produce suicide attackers; seven of the 22 (32 percent) countries that met both 
conditions here produced them.  This example highlights the recurring problem of over 
reduction in studies of suicide missions.      
 Our evolved psychological predisposition to both favor kin and preserve ourselves 
is a powerful force, but there are situations where other factors overtake rationality: 
people adopt unrelated children and treat them as they would their own (Gibson 2009); in 
the West, altruism is a standard component of marriage between unrelated individuals; 





with high OSRs, YORs, and polygyny necessarily have relatively high numbers of 
unmarried men, but that does not mean they are unattached: Atran (2010) and Ricolfi 
(2005) suggest friendship and peer pressure are key drivers for suicide attackers.  Ricolfi 
(2005), for example, mentions an 11 player soccer team from Hebron that produced eight 
suicide bombers, suggesting that small group dynamics drive individuals to volunteer for 
suicide missions.   
 In militaries all over the world, such bands of brothers form, creating and 
reinforcing deep emotional bonds between members (Atran 2010).  Commitment to one 
another, in conjunction with the ability for seemingly all humans to dehumanize others 
based on arbitrary characteristics (à la Elliott’s classic “Blue Eyes/Brown Eyes” 
experiment) makes it clear that some are intensely, even easily, motivated to act 
“irrationally” when sacrificing for comrades.  Populations with male-biased OSR have 
greater numbers of unmarried men, possibly increasing the size of the local "friend pool."  
Research on the role of friendship in suicide missions is fleeting, mostly because of the 
difficulty finding suitable subjects, but intergroup competition increases cooperation 
between male group members in public goods experiments (Van Vugt et al. 2007). 
 Humans are unique in their ability for high order theory of mind, which gives 
them the ability to conceptualize and sacrifice for causes far beyond themselves and their 
kin.  They also do irrational things like sacrifice large percentages of their income, 
disfigure their bodies, and pray to cure diseases rather than seeing a doctor.  Clearly, the 
motivation to sacrifice one’s life for a piece of land, or a transcendent political or 
religious ideal, is predicated on evolved psychological frameworks which are just now 






 A male-biased OSR or lack of reproductive opportunities does not explain all 
suicide attacks.  People gain meaning and purpose from things other than marriage, 
including work.  According to Ricolfi (2005:115), Palestinian suicide missions are often 
caused by a lack of economic alternatives 
In a society in which social life is frozen and horizons and normal careers do not 
exist, war and the Intifada are not just the only world but the only real social 
system. 
 
[Within this system] the shortest route to the highest position, since it confers 
prestige and can bestow eternal glory, is indeed that of the martyr. 
 
The real question to ask is: why has glory become so important in Palestine?  The 
answer is as simple as it is disarming: because almost everything else is missing.  
 
From 2000 to 2006, Palestinian unemployment rates and income inequality were 
correlated with suicide attacks; but not in the most obvious way.  When unemployment 
rose, so did the average age and educational level of suicide attackers (Benmelech et al. 
2010).  This suggests that Palestinians who might normally be employed are more apt to 
volunteer for suicide missions when jobless; they are, in turn, better able than less 
educated and younger attackers to complete their missions (Benmelech et al. 2010).  
Theoretically, high OSR should increase competition for the types of jobs men do.  This 
competition may be especially fierce where women are limited in the workforce due to 
gender discrimination. There is surprisingly little literature on the relationship between 
OSR and unemployment, but a regression analysis using data from the CIA World 
Factbook (National Foreign Assessment Center (U.S.) and United States. Central 
Intelligence Agency. 2009) shows no significant relationship in the sex ratio of 15 to 64 





Further research into a possible link between OSR, unemployment, and terrorism could 
be fruitful. 
 
Politics and Religion 
 Suicide missions are puzzling, counterintuitive, and people are interested in them.  
What makes them effective, aside from the capacity to kill, is that they show profound 
commitment to a cause.  It might not be surprising, then, that groups using suicide attacks 
appear to fall into two camps; those motivated by religion, and those motivated by 
politics or nationalism:  both of which encourage sacrifice and selflessness between 
likeminded individuals.   
   Pape’s thesis that nationalism causes suicide missions suggests they are caused, in 
part, by a lack of political autonomy.  Less democratic countries are more likely to 
produce suicide attackers (see Table 2), and this effect holds even after economic and 
demographic factors like GDP, Gini Coefficient, YOR and OSR are controlled; it fails 
only after social factors like polygyny and religion are considered.  Rather than assuming 
a single root cause of terrorism, Atran (2010) and others have begun pointing out marked 
differences between religious and secular perpetrators.  Secular groups are motivated by 
material goals like national and political independence, separation, and revolution (Fine 
2008).  Religious groups appear to be motivated by these things, and more, because their 
objectives are couched in spiritual ideals far more transcendent than their secular 
counterparts.  Bin-Laden’s stated goals, after all, were to rid the Middle East of Western 
influence and, secondarily, to return the region to a Sharia legal and political system: 





religiously.  This fact circles a point made in the introduction of this paper: it is difficult 
to say that religion increases a group’s propensity to use suicide attacks because there is 
no non-religious control sample to test the hypothesis that it does, and other factors, like 
nationalism, appear to motivate people as well (Purzycki and Gibson 2011).  While 
populations with higher proportions of Muslims are more likely to produce suicide 
attackers, not all of attackers are Muslim, and not all countries with Muslim majorities 
churn them out.  Islam combines religion, culture, politics, and law, making it difficult to 
distinguish where one begins, another ends, and what influences suicide attacks more.  
For this reason, it might be best to replace the term “religiously motivated terrorism” with 
“religiously justified terrorism” as religion seems maximally useful for distinguishing in-
group and outgroup affiliations based on transcendent supernatural assumptions.  This 
may give religious groups an edge over secular ones by encouraging prosocial behavior 
(Sosis and Alcorta 2008), but further investigation is needed to say for sure.   
    
Demography 
 Unattached young men are risk takers and populations with relatively high 
numbers of them are more likely to produce suicide attackers than those without.  The 
finding that OSR increases suicide attacker production supports the notion that a lack of 
available females leaves more men unoccupied and, perhaps, more open to recruitment 
and radicalization.      
 The negative relationship between YOR and suicide attacker production was 
unexpected and suggests that if male-male competition is a factor in creating attackers, it 





younger than themselves (Casterline et al. 1986; Dixon 1971) and populations with 
relatively large numbers of older men experience a tightening of the marriage market 
from younger men’s perspective.  Middle Eastern men marry women averaging about 5 
to 10 years their juniors (Casterline et al. 1986); this, coupled with polygyny, leaves large 
numbers of young men unmarried.  In 2007 Saudi Arabia for example, about 40% of men 
younger than 30 were unmarried compared to about 26% of women; by 35, only about 
13% of men and 10% of women were unmarried (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs Population Division 2009).  Large marital age disparity and 
polygyny potentially reverse the tendency for high YOR to propel violence; whether they 
do is open to further investigation.   
 
Stopping Suicide Attacks 
 
To generalize, lack of resources for high levels of destruction combined with 
ample opportunity for low-level and low-risk resistance, an absence of 
inflammatory rhetoric, and control over the use of violence by local authorities 
inhibited suicide terrorism (Crenshaw p.147). 
 
 Individual, social, and strategic factors all contribute to the use of suicide 
missions; because of this, a multifaceted approach is needed to stop them.  How else can 
the world allay their appeal?  According to Atran (2005), increasing literacy rates and 
reducing poverty will have no effect on the production of suicide missions and may even 
encourage the tactic by broadening exposure to radicalism or worsening economic 
prospects for the middle class if wealth is shifted from their hands.  A punitive approach 
to the problem is also likely to fail because tit-for-tat nature of suicide attacks (Atran 
2005).  Strategies that might work, in addition to those discussed above, include 





seriously the goals of perpetrating groups, which may mean conceding to them in some 
capacity (Atran 2005:7; Atran 2010).          
 Although a singular approach to the issue is unlikely to stop all suicide attacks in 
all places, things can be done to limit their appeal.  Pape advocates “offshore balancing,” 
or placing military vessels offshore near military hot spots, rather than building 
traditional military installations and bases.  This is consistent with his thesis that the 
presence of foreign troops on sacred soil is the root cause of suicide missions, but this 
would not stop all attacks because not all attacks are caused solely by the presence of 
foreign troops on sacred soil.  Atran suggests “changing the motivations of potential 
recruits, disrupting sponsors’ organizations, and undermining popular support” in order 
mitigate suicide missions (Atran 2006:142).    
 Suicide missions require social support, and those that fail to tailor themselves to 
local mores fail (Bloom 2005).  Turning people against them might be possible through 
marketing.  To combat the exaltation of suicide “martyrs,” concerted efforts might be 
made to show the murderous nature of each attack.  A gruesome but effective way to do 
this might involve publicizing images of children or elderly people killed during suicide 
attacks.    
 Profiling, racial and criminal, is a controversial means of stopping terrorism.  The 
problem with profiling should be familiar to any anthropologist; while operatives in small 
cells may be similar, there are large between group differences, making profiling difficult 
(Atran 2006).  This paper does not show that Muslims are more likely to be suicide 





likely to produce them.  This important distinction means analysts might do best to look 
at the countries of origin of potential threats rather than their religions.    
 Decreasing OSR, tempering polygyny, and decreasing YOR may curb suicide 
missions.  OSR could be decreased naturally by encouraging parental solicitude toward 
females, or artificially by removing some males from the population through mandatory 
conscription or emigration (Cincotta 2004).  Many might return, but a two or three year 
absence would effectively remove them from the marriage pool; and, at any one time, 
fewer men would compete for reproductive opportunities.  The two year missionary 
requirement for members of the Church of Latter Day Saints is conceivably a remnant of 
the church’s polygynous past.  Less attractive options for reducing OSR include 
decreasing parental solicitude for males, or repressing them outright (the latter idea is 
from Cincotta 2004).   
 Polygyny has deep religious, social, cultural, and political roots, and it may be 
difficult or impossible to slow absent massive intervention.  Despite this, cross-cultural 
data show that polygyny is significantly associated with high pathogen stress in state 
level societies in addition to male mortality in warfare in nonstate societies (Ember et al. 
2007).  Lowering the number of deaths caused by violence and disease may then decrease 
instances of polygyny and open the marriage market up to young men, resulting in fewer 
willing to participate in suicide missions.       
 Manipulating YOR presents a serious issue: While high values are associated with 
violence and civil war (Cincotta et al. 2003b; Mesquida and Weiner 1999), low values are 
linked with suicide attacker production.  Civil war kills far more people than suicide 





raising it.  According to Cincotta et al. (2003b) reducing YOR is possible by promoting 
demographic transitions through family planning, HIV and AIDS education and 
awareness, and improving women’s educational economic, and legal status.  
   
Conclusion 
 One of the most striking things about suicide missions is their relative 
infrequency; the tactic grabs headlines, but is still uncommon.  Over the 26 years sampled 
here, 1,208 people died as suicide attackers; yet the Global Terrorism Database (2011) 
reports 70,512 terrorist incidents over the same period.  These suicide attacks claimed at 
least 12,328 lives, making the odds of dying in such a tragedy roughly 1 in 500,000.  For 
comparison, the odds of a US citizen dying from a lightning strike in 2007 were nearly 
six times this (National Safety Council 2011).  This back of the envelope calculation is 
not meant to diminish the significance of these deaths: it is meant to show how unlikely 
they are.   
 This dissertation found a link between OSR, YOR, polygyny, Islam, population 
size, and whether a country produced suicide attackers from 1981 to 2007.  A relationship 
was also found in the number of attackers produced by a country and polygyny rates, 
Gini Coefficient, Democracy Index, and GNP.  Earlier work found that the presence of 
foreign troops on sacred soil, religion, nationalism, societal support and economic 
opportunities all appear to play some role in generating suicide attackers.  Future 
researchers should incorporate OSR, polygyny, and possibly YOR in their analyses.  A 





opportunity, and a variable for foreign presence on ethnic or sacred soil would be the best 
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